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DOMESTIC OBLIGATIONS IN BANKRUPTCY
PIERRE R. LoIsEAux*
Two ideas have been embodied in each of our bankrupty acts.
The first is that there should be an equal distribution of the non-
exempt assets of the insolvent debtor among general creditors.
Although this idea has been modified and qualified considerably by
other competing interests and overriding policies, one basic goal in
bankruptcy is equal distribution of the assets. The second idea of
note is that the honest debtor shall be given a fresh start in the
community. This rehabilitation idea is not solely for the benefit of
the individual but for the benefit of the economic community as a
whole. We all suffer if one individual is required to remain under
an impossible debt load. It is feared that the individual will simply
lose all ambition and social usefulness unless he is forgiven his debts
and given an opportunity to show that the financial problems which
put him in this situation were fortuitous. Given a new chance it is
hoped that he can prove to be a productive and useful citizen. To
this second basic idea we have also appended numerous exceptions,
again resulting from competing ideas and interests which have been'
carefully weighed by Congress before being allowed to override the
fresh-start idea. The evolving law of bankruptcy has demonstrated
a pattern whereby discharge is increasingly available to the honest
debtor, with a parallel development that the number of obligations
not affected by bankruptcy discharge is gradually increasing. This
results in a situation where the honest debtor will obtain a discharge
almost as a matter of right, but the discharge will not relieve him of
many of the troublesome obligations which plague everyone in our
complex and ever-changing society.
Social attitudes about the family are also undergoing constant
change. The patterns of our divorce laws have grown from the
relatively rare legislative divorce as a matter of political grace to the
present mail-order divorce business in some states and the short,
fake-residence divorce in many another state. As is usually the case,
the changing law reflects the attitudes of the people and it is apparent
that our collective attitudes about marriage and divorce have changed
considerably in the last two centuries. This is partly attributable
to the changing attitude toward woman and her role in our society.
* Professor of Law, University of Texas.
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For a number of reasons the female in our mid-twentieth century
society is not entirely dependent upon the male. When a woman
marries she does not lose her independence and identity as was once
the case. Today a married woman is not only employable but pre-
ferred over the single employee in many cases. The number of
double-income families has constantly increased in recent decades-
statistical testimony to the independence of married women; many
women have not lost their earning power and will not be rendered
destitute by the loss of the husband. One might also read into
modern divorce and re-marriage statistics the suspicion that the
concept of the "used woman" has changed or is changing. To the
ancient Anglo-American heritage that to each woman there shall
be but one man, one might add "at one time." The ancient idea of
divorce as only a legally approved privilege to live apart from one's
spouse has been replaced by the concept of absolute divorce. How-
ever, in many of our states the idea of a continuing obligation to a
divorced wife has remained. Even in some of the community prop-
erty states which have leaned heavily on the partnership concept of
marriage there remains hanging on the idea of continuing obligation
for the support and maintenance of the former spouse. Does our
law reflect accurately and properly the changing attitudes of our
society?
No attempt will be made to answer the above question in any
general sense. This paper is concerned only with a review of the
background and development of the law in respect to the effect of
bankruptcy of' the husband upon domestic obligations incurred as a
result of marriage.
The present Bankruptcy Act in section 17(2) provides in part "A
discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all of his
provable debts, whether allowable in full or in part, except such as...
are liabilities for ... alimony due or to become due, or for mainte-
nance or support of wife or child. . . ." This language was added
to the Bankruptcy Act by amendment in 1903; prior to that time the
act made no mention of the effect of a discharge in bankruptcy on
domestic obligations.
PROVABILITY OF CLAIMS FOR ALIMONY AND SUPPORT
Before the addition in 1903 of the present provisions of the Bank-
ruptcy Act, which expressly excluded domestic obligations from




bankruptcy discharge, the question of the effect of a discharge in
bankruptcy had been raised in several cases. The United States
Supreme Court faced the problem in Wetmore v. Markoe,2 and al-
though the amendment to the Bankruptcy Act had been passed at the
time of the decision, the case arose before the amendment and the
disposition was not made under the amended Bankruptcy Act. In
Wetmore the bankrupt husband sought to enjoin all proceedings on
behalf of his wife for the collection of alimony and child support.
Counsel for the bankrupt husband argued that because the judgment
for alimony was not subject to modification in New York, it was an
absolute judgment, and such a judgment was a fixed liability, prov-
able as such under the terms of the Bankruptcy Act and thus dis-
chargeable. Mr. Justice Day, writing for the Court, agreed that
judgments are provable claims if they are for debts, but that the na-
ture of this obligation was such that it could not be and was not
considered a debt. This is evidenced by the fact that traditionally
courts have enforced alimony and support orders by imprisonment
for contempt in the face of provisions against imprisonment for debt
found in most of the states. The Court concluded that alimony is
a penalty imposed for failure to perform a legal duty. To embody such
a duty and penalty in a judgment cannot make it a debt within the
meaning of the Bankruptcy Act.3 The Court had said substantially
the same thing in the earlier cases of Audubon v. Shufeldt' and
Dunbar v. Dunbar.5 The latter case involved a settlement agreement
whereby the husband was to pay a stated amount until the death or
remarriage of the wife. The Court there found that the claim was
too contingent to constitute a provable claim in the bankruptcy
proceeding.
There are some earlier cases where the federal district courts
permitted proof and allowance of claims for alimony and held that
such claims would not be barred by the granting of a discharge in
bankruptcy.6  However, even before the question was decided by
2 196 U.S. 68 (1904).
The Court followed the same reasoning and approach with reference to
the child support, holding it too was not discharged by the bankruptcy.
'181 U.S. 575 (1901).
190 U.S. 340 (1903).
'In re Challoner, 98 Fed. 82 (N.D. Ill. 1899) (held that accrued alimony
was a debt without passing on the status in bankruptcy of future alimony) ;
lit re Van Orden, 96 Fed. 86 (D.N.J. 1899) (bankruptcy court enjoined
wife's suit to collect alimony from bankrupt husband because the claim was
both provable and dischargeable); In re Houston, 94 Fed. 119 (D. Ky. 1899)
(order to release a man held under state court contempt order because the
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the Supreme Court in the Wetmore case, the majority of courts had
found that such claims were not provable and were thus unaffected
by the husband's bankruptcy."
Although the 1903 amendment to the Bankruptcy Act has made
further litigation unnecessary insofar as establishing the nondis-
chargeability of obligations for alimony or support, the claim of a
wife in bankruptcy proceedings based upon such an accrued obliga-
tion is very much in doubt, and the wife is generally not allowed to
share in the bankrupt's estate.s An argument can be made that the
language of section 17, which states: "A discharge in bankruptcy
shall release a bankrupt from all of his provable debts, whether allow-
able in full or in part, except . . ." implies that the listed exceptions
are provable debts and can both share in the estate and seek satis-
faction out of after-acquired assets. Such is the case with most of
the claims found in the exceptions; they may share in the estate and
also seek to enforce their claims against the bankrupt after discharge.'
Is this then a way to discriminate against the wife and children
holding a decree for alimony or a support order? Judge Denison
thought not and said so clearly in Heimberger v. Josep"1 where the
court held that notes given by the husband for accrued alimony were
provable claims. In so holding the court stated:
We find no authoritative holding that, since the amendment
of 1903, alimony claims continue to be nonprovable. Both the
obligation was held to be dischargeable); cf. Fite v. Fite, 110 Ky. 197, 61
S.W. 26 (1901) (under Kentucky law alimony was a provable debt both
accrued and unaccrued).
" Turner v. Turner, 108 Fed. 785 (D. Ind. 1901) ; It re Nowell, 99 Fed.
931 (D. Mass. 1900); In re Shepard, 97 Fed. 187 (S.D.N.Y. 1899); Welty
v. Welty, 195 Ill. 335, 63 N.E. 161 (1902) (alimony or support is not a debt
but a penalty for failure to perform a duty) ; Deen v. Bloomer, 191 Ill. 416,
61 N.E. 131 (1901) (alimony is not a debt but an obligation imposed by
public policy); Barclay v. Barclay, 184 Ill. 375, 56 N.E. 636 (1900) (alimony
is not a provable claim and not dischargeable); Young v. Young, 35 Misc.
335, 71 N.Y. Supp. 944 (Sup. Ct. 1901) (bankruptcy has no effect upon ali-
mony); Maisner v. Maisner, 62 App. Div. 286, 70 N.Y. Supp. 1107 (1st
Dept. 1901) (a claim for alimony is not a debt).
'Audubon v. Shufeldt, 181 U.S. 575 (1901) and Wetmore v. Markoe,
196 U.S. 68 (1904), indicated that the duty to support was not a debt, and
hence not a provable debt even if evidenced by a judgment. When the 1903
amendment was passed, the courts viewed the amendment as declaratory of
prior law, and hence the courts for the most part have continued to view ali-
mony as a penalty instead of a debt. But see Heimberger v. Joseph, 55 F.2d
171 (6th Cir. 1931).
Many of the exceptions of § 17 of the Bankruptcy Act are specifically
declared to be provable debt by § 63(a) of the Bankruptcy Act." 55 F.2d 171 (6th Cir. 1931).
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Dunbar and Wetmore Cases refer to this amendment, but
from another point of view. Both involved cases arising
before the amendment; neither has any bearing on provability
since the change. Indeed, the public policy declared in these
two cases inevitably requires that, for alimony accrued and
certain, the wife and children should share in the estate, even
if they may have no preference. With confidence equal to that
of the Supreme Court in the Wetmore Case, we may say that
Congress never intended a bankruptcy petition to be a means
by which a man could exclude the past-due and adjudicated
claims of wife and children for maintenance and support from
getting any dividend payments out of his estate. That un-
fortunate result was to some extent necessary in avoiding
the (supposed) greater evil of complete release (Audubon v.
Shufeldt) ; that necessity ended with the statutory declara-
tion of 1903.11
It would seem that despite the uncertainty of judges and writers on
this point, the law is that accrued alimony or support liabilities are
provable claims and should share in the bankrupt's estate. The
question of future liability for support or alimony is a more difficult
one and here the reasoning of the Dunbar, Wetmore, and Audubon
cases should still apply with the same force as when they were writ-
ten. What about the future support or alimony order that is not
contingent in the sense that it is not subject to modification? This
claim is still too contingent because of possible remarriage, even if
we accept statistical guessing on the life expectancy of the wife.
Such may not be the situation of the children for whose support the
husband is liable, for the age of majority is certain even though the
time of emancipation may be subject to fluctuation. Perhaps in this
situation the court should allow a provable claim from the present
age of the child to the age legally allowed for marriage at the present
place of residence. 2
ALIMONY AND SUPPORT OR PROPERTY SETTLEMENT
When it is apparent that divorce will follow it is very common
for husband and wife to make a settlement agreement. Such an
11 Id. at 173.
1 See generally 3 CoLLiER, BANKRUPTCY § 63.13 (14th ed. 1961) ; Hart-
man, The Dischargeability of Debts in Bankruptcy, 15 VAND. L. REV. 13
(1961) ; Joslin, Bankruptcy from a Family Law Perspective, 9 YAND. L. REv.
789 (1956).
19621
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agreement in contemplation of divorce may make many different
provisions as to the present property and rights of the spouses and
as to future obligations of the husband for alimony or support of the
wife and for support of the children. It may, on the other hand,
relate solely to a division of the presently-owned property of the
spouses making no mention of any future obligation of support. Such
an agreement may bear many different labels or may not be labeled
at all. It is apparent, however, that the courts should not be and are
not bound by the presence or absence of a label or the connotation
contained therein."3 If not found to be unfair, such a settlement will
normally be incorporated into the decree of divorce, or approved by
the judge when he enters a divorce decree which makes no reference
to the property or future obligations of the parties. In the event that
the parties have not made any agreement prior to the commencement
of the action or in contemplation thereof, the court will enter a
decree or order establishing the rights of the parties to the property
accumulated and providing for future obligations of the husband if
the state law so provides.
In the event of the husband's bankruptcy the exact nature of
this settlement agreement or decree may be in issue. Is this a lia-
bility for support or alimony within the meaning of section 17(2)
of the Bankruptcy Act? The general "pigeonholing" problem is to
put this obligation, whether agreed by the parties or ordered by the
court, into the area known as property settlement or into the area
of alimony or support.
No restatement definition is available of the terms "alimony"
and "support," and there are surprisingly few judicial definitions of
these terms. It might be thought that the terms are self-evident,
and that no serious problem could arise as to their content: this is
not the case. In Merriman v. Hawbaker 4 the following definition
of alimony was given:
Alimony, a word derived from the Latin term alere, meaning
to nourish or sustain, commonly means in law all allowances,
whether partial or in gross, which a husband by order of
court, in pursuance of his common-law or statutory duty to
support his wife pays her for her maintenance while they are
separated-or divorced. 5
"E.g., Yarus v. Yarus, 3 Cal. Rptr. 50 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960); Remon-
dino v. Remondino, 41 Cal. App. 2d 208, 106 P.2d 437 (Dist. Ct. App. 1904).
1 5 F. Supp. 432 (E.D. Ill. 1934).
15 Id. at 433.
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Thus if alimony is to be defined in terms of maintenance'and sup-
port, it is apparent that the Bankruptcy Act is redundant and that
alimony is an obligation to support the wife. A study of the opin-
ions discussing section 17(2) would indicate that for all purposes
the terms "alimony" and "support" are used to mean the same
thing.'6
In deciding what constitutes an agreement or order for support,
it is necessary to determine the essential attributes of such an obliga-
tion. The courts which have considered this problem, while not in
complete accord as to the proper approach, have generally singled out
certain characteristics as important. Most frequently discussed is
the length of time that is provided for the payment of sums in the
future. If the time period is short this may indicate a property settle-
ment which is to be paid in installments. However, a short period
of time alone will not be sufficient to demonstrate that the decree
embodied a property settlement. The California courts, on several
occasions, have been faced with this problem of distinguishing be-
tween a property settlement and a liability for support. In Yarus v.
Yarus17 a divorce decree ordered a "property settlement" of $16,200
which the husband was to pay in stated monthly installments for six
years. The order contained a further provision that all liability of
the husband, except as to payments accrued at that time, would cease
upon the death or remarriage of the wife. The appellate court
affirmed the trial court's declaratory judgment that this was a lia-
bility for support even though the divorce decree had labeled it a
property settlement. It must be conceded, however, that the court
was apparently more influenced by the termination provisions re-
lating to death or remarriage than by the short period of time for
which support had been ordered.
In cases where the agreement or order does not provide that
periodic payments are to stop in the event of death or remarriage of
the wife, it is likely that the court will conclude that such payments
are in satisfaction of a property settlement and do not create a lia-
bility for support of the wife. In Tropp v. Tropp,"s an earlier Cali-
fornia case, the contract entered into between the parties provided
"6 Cf. In re Adams, 25 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1928). In Adams there was an
agreement made before the divorce which provided that the husband would
pay the wife an annuity. The court held that this could not be alimony for in
New York the guilty party is not entitled to such; rather it was a liability for
support and thus not dischargeable.
" 3 Cal. Rptr. 50 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960).
8 129 Cal. App. 62, 18 P.2d 385 (Dist. Ct. App. 1933).
19621
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for the payment of $250 per month by husband to wife and $50,000
to be paid in ten annual installments. By the terms of the contract
the monthly payments were to stop upon the remarriage of the wife,
but the annual payments were to be unaffected by remarriage. A
further provision provided that the monthly payments were to de-
crease $25 after each annual installment was paid. The wife re-
married and shortly thereafter the husband went into bankruptcy
and was duly discharged. In the action by the wife to recover the
payments the court found that the obligation to pay monthly install-
ments was terminated by the terms of the agreement itself and that
the liability for annual payments was an ordinary debt within the
meaning of the Bankruptcy Act and was discharged by the bank-
ruptcy action. The attempt in Tropp to link what was clearly a
liability for support to another liability found in the same contract
which was clearly a property settlement caused the court considerable
difficulty. Thus in drafting pre-divorce agreements, it would seem
advisable for counsel to put clauses for future payments by husband
to wife clearly into one category or the other."9
In Remondino v. Remondino,20 another California case, the par-
ties signed a contract providing that the husband would pay the wife
$100 per month for the rest of her life. The agreement further
provided that he would keep his life insured in her favor in the
amount of $5,000, and that in the event the wife should commence
divorce proceedings the husband would pay her attorney's fees of
$150. The contract also contained property releases executed by
each spouse. Thereafter the husband obtained the divorce. The
decree stated "that said property settlement agreement and each and
all the terms and covenants thereof be, and the same are, by the
court, confirmed." 2' Some sixteen years later, when the husband
was behind in the agreed payments to the extent of $11,000, the hus-
band was declared a bankrupt and discharged. Thereafter the wife
brought this action to collect the back payments and the husband
pleaded his discharge in bankruptcy. The trial court entered judg-
ment for the wife and ordered execution to issue for the collection
thereof. The appellate court affirmed, holding that this was an
obligation for support. In so holding the court stated: "If, upon a
consideration of the entire transaction the court determines that the
"9 See California Divorce Agreements-Alimony or Property Settlement?,
2 STAN. L. REv. 731 (1950).
2 41 Cal. App. 2d 208, 106 P.2d 437 (Dist. Ct. App. 1940).
211 Id. at 213, 106 P.2d at 440.
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purpose of the judgment for support money is to guarantee the eco-
nomic safety of the wife by the husband, then his discharge in bank-
ruptcy does not affect his liability under the judgment."22
In the Remondino case the coturt recognized that, under Cali-
fornia law, if the divorce is granted to the husband for the wife's
fault, she is not entitled to support or alimony.2" But the court fur-
ther pointed out that under the facts of the case this was not a bar to
the wife's action. The agreement entered into between the parties in
Remondino clearly intimated that the fault might be that of the hus-
band; there was no evidence that the wife was guilty of any improper
conduct. In a more recent California case the court took a much
more doctrinaire approach to the problem of a husband getting the
divorce. In Snalley v. Smalley24 the parties, prior to divorce, en-
tered into an agreement whereby the wife waived all rights to
support and alimony and the husband agreed to pay the wife the sum
of $3,000 at the rate of $50 per month. The husband subsequently
obtained a divorce. The divorce decree approved the pre-divorce
agreement, and 'ordered the husband to pay the $3,000. The* court
reasoned that because in California the court has no power to grant
alimony where the divorce is granted to the husband for the wife's
fault, and that because in California any liability for support ends
with divorce except as modified by an order for alimony, the $50
monthly payments had to constitute a property settlement which
was dischargeable in bankruptcy. Because this was so there was
no need for any construction of the decree by the court.
Facing the property settlement or support dilemma again in the
case of Blair v. Blair," the California court found a situation in
which the husband had promised in a pre-divorce agreement to
create a trust fund of $300,000. The annual income from the trust
was to be paid to the wife at the rate of $18,000 per year for the
rest of her life, and if the income did not equal that amount the
husband was to make up the difference from other sources. The
court concluded that this contract created a liability for support in
the face of the husband's claim of a discharge in bankruptcy. The
opinion states that "the fact that the agreement was called a property
settlement and was referred to as such in the decree divorcing the
"I1d. at 214, 106 P.2d at 441.
23 Id. at 216, 106 P.2d at 442.
1 Cal. Rptr. 440 (Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
44 Cal. App. 2d 140, 112 P.2d 39 (Dist. Ct. App. 1941).
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parties is immaterial. It is the substance of the contract that con-
trols in a determination of the intent of the contracting parties.""0
In In re Adams27 the husband, prior to divorce, had contracted
to pay his wife an annuity until her death. The divorce was granted
to the husband. The court found that the annuity could not be the
equivalent of alimony because in New York the guilty party is not
entitled to alimony. But this obligation was nevertheless found to
be an obligation for support of the wife within section 17(2) of the
Bankruptcy Act. An accepted policy of the state, to the effect that a
wife guilty of conduct which gives her husband the right to obtain
the divorce cannot receive alimony, might well be construed to include
liability for support for the two terms are virtually identical.
In some situations the court may find that the award made to
the wife represents both a property settlement and payments for sup-
port. When later considering the effect of a discharge in bankruptcy
is it proper for a court to divide the award by holding that part of
the award was for support and the rest was a property settlement
and discharged by the bankruptcy proceeding? In In re Aver?28
such a result was reached. The Michigan divorce decree ordered
the husband to pay his wife $9,000 in installments of $150 per month.
The court looked into the record of the divorce proceeding and
ascertained that of the $9,000 total awarded, $2,451.87 represented
release of property rights. Collection was enjoined on that much of
the total award which represented release of property rights. That
part had been discharged by the husband's bankruptcy.
Examination of the above cited opinions leaves one with the
impression that the essential element of support is a continuing obli-
gation on the husband which will terminate either when the need
ends or when the duty is assumed by another. In those cases where
the terms of the settlement or decree do not provide for termination
on death or remarriage, the court will usually find this to be a
property settlement with the result that the obligation is a provable
claim which may be discharged in bankruptcy. If the settlement or
decree expressly provides that the liability will not be affected by
death or remarriage, it is quite certain that the court will find the
arrangement to be a property settlement.29
"Id. at 143, 112 P.2d at 42.
-725 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1928).
28 114 F.2d 768 (6th Cir. 1940).
29 Compare INT. REv. CODE oF 1954, §§ 71, 215, 682. The taxing authori-
ties are also faced with the problem of distinguishing between property settle-
ments and liabilities for alimony or support.
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ITEMS INCLUDED WITHIN ALIMONY AND SUPPORT
There has been no dissent to the proposition that counsel fees
incurred in the divorce proceeding are a part of alimony and that
liabilities therefor are not affected by the subsequent bankruptcy of
the husband.3 In many states this result has been codified in
statutes which provide for alimony and expressly make counsel fees
a part of alimony or part of the husband's statutory duty to the wife.3
It has also been held that costs of suit incurred in the divorce action
are a part of alimony within the meaning of section 17(2) of the
Bankruptcy Act. 2
An interesting question is presented in In re Sullivan.3 There
the defendant, whose brother had been sued for nonsupport by his
wife and had executed a bond for security, was persuaded to sign the
bond as surety. Later the brother's wife sued her husband and de-
fendant on the bond. Upon being sued, defendant filed a petition in
bankruptcy after which the wife argued that the bond was clearly an
obligation for support of a wife within the express terms of the Bank-
ruptcy Act. The court had no trouble deciding that section 17(2)
is most certainly to be read as if the express language read "liability
for alimony or support of [his] wife or child." With such a proper
reading of the act the bond as to bankrupt surety was an ordinary
debt and was dischargeable.
If, before the divorce is granted, a husband and wife execute an
agreement which provides that the husband will purchase a house
for the wife to live in and that he will also pay certain monthly pay-
ments, the obligation to purchase the house is part of the husband's
obligation to support his wife and therefore unaffected by any subse-
quent bankruptcy of the husband." Furthermore, the liability of
a bankrupt husband to make mortgage payments on a residence which
his wife occupies is nondischargeable. Such payments are on the
same footing as the husband's agreement for maintenance and sup-
port, and thus unaffected by the bankruptcy of the husband."s Simi-
larly in Lyon v. Lyon, 6 the court held that a contract or agreement
" It re Brennen, 39 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D.N.Y. 1941).
"Damon v. Damon, 283 F.2d 571 (1st Cir. 1960); Ross v. Keith, 238
App. Div. 640, 265 N.Y. Supp. 246 (1st Dept. 1933).
"' Smith v. Smith, 7 F. Supp. 490 (W.D.N.Y. 1934). In Smith the court
also pointed out that it was proper for the judge to look behind a judgment
for costs to ascertain in what connection the costs were levied.
"262 Fed. 574 (N.D.N.Y. 1920).
"Battles v. Battles, 205 Okla. 587, 239 P.2d 794 (1952).
"lIn re Gorski, 25 F. Supp. 551 (W.D.N.Y. 1938).
"115 Utah 466, 206 P.2d 148 (1949).
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requiring the husband to obtain or maintain certain life insurance
policies is properly a part of the obligation to support the wife. In
the Lyon case the court considered factors other than the agreement
between the parties in determining what items were to be considered
support under the circumstances. The present age of the wife, her
training, and the use to which she would put the property awarded
to her by the agreement, were all considered.
It can be said that almost any reasonable item of the wife's over-
all expense can be properly included within the general terms ali-
mony or support. It is not controling that a particular item of
continuing expense is singled out and expressly incorporated into the
agreement or order of the court. When the court considers the dis-
chargeability of a particular claim it should look to the entire situa-
tion between the parties to ascertain whether this one thing was a
reasonable item in the wife's over-all maintenance.
LIABILITY OF DISCHARGED HUSBAND TO THIRD PARTIES
Several cases arose shortly after the amendment in 1903 raising
questions as to the discharged husband's liability to third parties who
are supplying or have supplied necessaries to the wife or child. It
became apparent that any broad ruling allowing third parties who
supply necessaries to obtain a nondischargeable claim would go a
long way to defeat the "fresh-start" purpose of bankruptcy. Ac-
cordingly, it is held as a general proposition that those who supply
necessary goods or services on contract to the wife or child do not
obtain an obligation immune to the husband's future discharge in
bankruptcy." In order for any obligation to come within the ex-
ception in section 17(2), it must run directly to the wife or child
from the husband and father. Thus in Schellenberg v. Mullaney88
the seller of clothing argued that such clothing was for the bankrupt
father's children and constituted a necessary item of the children's
support and therefore the liability arising from the sale was not dis-
charged. After considering this argument, the court simply stated
that the father's purchase of the clothing left him free to do as he
liked with it, and for this reason section 17(2) did not apply-the
debt was discharged. Similarly, in several cases a discharged father
has been sued by a boarding school for the cost of room and board
"E.g., In re Lo Grasso, 23 F. Supp. 340 (W.D.N.Y. 1938) ; Schellenberg
v. Mullaney, 112 App. Div. 384, 98 N.Y. Supp. 432 (2d Dept. 1906) ; Schwoll
v. Meeks, 76 Ohio App. 231, 63 N.E.2d 831 (1944)." Supra note 37.
[Vol. 41
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supplied to his minor children. The usual result reached is that
under section 17(2) the father's liability which is not discharged
is the common-law liability for support running directly to wife or
child; it is not a general exemption of obligations for necessaries.8
For the same reason, liabilities incurred for the services of doctors
and dentists, although necessary, are not included within the meaning
of liability for support of wife or child as found in section 17(2) of
the Bankruptcy Act. Thus, in In re Ostrander,40 an action was
brought by a physician who had performed services upon the wife
at the husband's request, during a time when the normal family
relation still existed. The court held that the subsequent discharge
of the husband in bankruptcy barred the physician's bill for services.
The court felt that such a result was necessary, otherwise all profes-
sional persons or merchants who contributed to the support of a wife
or child by furnishing goods or services, would be unaffected by
bankruptcy. The fact that the bankrupt had made a contract for
services in question indicates that there was in fact at that time no
breach of the primary duty owed by the husband towards the one
receiving the services.
There may, however, be situations in which a third party may
recover for necessaries supplied to the bankrupt's wife or child despite
his discharge in bankruptcy. Such a situation was recognized by
the court in Ostrander. The court qualified their holding by stating:
The provision has probable application to cases where the per-
son applying for discharge from his debts had so betrayed his
moral and legal duty as a husband or parent that another was
justified in providing the maintenance and support denied by
the one upon whom the law places the primary duty."
In general when the husband or parent contracts with a third party
for services or goods, the resulting obligation will be dischargeable.
But the situations referred to by the court in Ostrander are those in
which the husband and father failed to make any arrangements for
his dependents and the third party supplied services or goods without
the request or consent of the bankrupt. In such a situation the law
will create a duty in the bankrupt husband to reimburse the third
"0 General Protestant Orphans' Home v. Ivey, 240 F.2d 239 (6th Cir.
1956); In re Lo Grasso, 23 F. Supp. 340 (W.D.N.Y. 1938).
40 139 Fed. 592 (E.D.N.Y. 1905).
'1 Id. at 592.
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party for the claim. Thus in In re Myers42 the wife was ill and in
the hospital. When she was released from the hospital the husband
refused to provide any home for his wife. She boarded with the
plaintiff for $7.00 a week. Subsequently, plaintiff-landlord secured
judgment against the husband for the amount of the board furnished
to his wife. The husband then filed bankruptcy proceedings and
asked, under section 11(e) of the Bankruptcy Act, that the court
enjoin garnishment proceedings commenced by the plaintiff on the
basis that the plaintiff's claim was dischargeable in bankruptcy. The
court refused to enjoin the plaintiff's proceeding because the claim
was not dischargeable. In so holding, the court stated: "It was not
incurred upon an express or implied contract of the husband to pay
therefor, but arose out of the involuntary liability and primary duty
growing out of the marriage relation."'43 In It re Lo Grasso44 a
father entered into an agreement with a school to provide for the
maintenance of his two infant children. The father, upon being de-
clared a bankrupt, sought to restrain the school from enforcing its
claim against him on the grounds that he was discharged by bank-
ruptcy. In holding that the father was discharged, the court stated:
"Section 17... was not intended to include a liability upon an agree-
ment made by a parent to pay for the support and maintenance of his
children. It was intended to include liability where a parent had
failed or refused to make provision for maintenance and such was
furnished by another. '45 A contrary result was reached in the later
case of Leib v. Auerbach."" In Leib a father was sued on an express
promise for expenses incurred by plaintiff in maintaining his daugh-
ter. The defendant father pleaded his discharge in bankruptcy as a
defense to the action. The court held that the obligation was not
discharged. The Lo Grasso case was distinguished on the basis
that the plaintiff in Leib, who was the daughter's aunt, stood in loco
parentis, and the home in Lo Grasso which was excluded from the
exceptions of section 17(2) did not stand in loco parentis. But a
home of the sort complaining in the Lo Grasso case would normally
be considered just as much in loco parentis as the aunt in the Leib
case, and further, when another stands in loco parentis the test is
still whether this person agreed to assume that status or whether that
42 12 F.2d 938 (W.D.N.Y. 1926).
43 Id. at 938.
"' 23 F. Supp. 340 (W.D.N.Y. 1938).
,5 Id. at 340.
"' 10 N.J. Super. 391, 76 A.2d 726 (Super. Ct, 1950).
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person assumed such status because of the need of the dependent
without the request or knowledge of the bankrupt. If, as in the Leib
case, there was an agreement that the aunt Would occupy this status,
it is difficult to understand why the aunt should be in any more
favorable position than the doctor, grocer, or merchant discussed
above.
The Supreme Court of Washington split in an opinion written
on a matter somewhat analogous to the above proposition. In Rape
v. Lene4 ' a divorce decree contained an order that the husband pay
$50 per month for the support of his minor children. Shortly after
the entry of the decree the husband made an agreement with certain
third parties whereby they would adopt the children and that there-
after the husband would pay $50 per month to the third parties.
The husband then went bankrupt and was duly discharged. In a
subsequent suit by the third parties to recover payment in arrears
under this contract, the husband pleaded his discharge in bankruptcy.
The court, with two judges dissenting, held that this contractual
liability of the husband was not discharged. The majority found
this to be a liability for support within the exceptions contained in
section 17.48 The two dissenting judges, however, reasoned that the
state statute on adoption placed the primary responsibility on the
new parents and this same statute relieved the defendant of any
liability for support. Therefore, this contract between defendant
husband and the third parties was a simple contract for debt which
should be dischargeable in bankruptcy. This case seems to stand as
an anomaly in an area where the courts generally have been extremely
reluctant to expand the exceptions contained in section 17(2) of the
Bankruptcy Act. In other cases when the husband and father has
made an express contract with a third party who is to supply goods
or services which constitute items of support, the courts have refused
to allow the third party the protection of the exception granted to
claims for support.49 It would certainly seem apparent that the
' 151 Wash. 675, 276 Pac. 868 (1929).
48In so holding, the court noted that the consideration for the adoption
contract was (1) the agreement by the third parties that they would adopt
the children, and (2) the agreement by the divorced mother of the children
to waive the provisions of the divorce decree with reference to the main-
tenance and support of the children. The court felt that due to the direct
and immediate connection between the contractual obligation to pay for main-
tenance and support, the adoption itself, and the divorce, the debt created
should not be discharged.
,' In re Lo Grasso, 23 F. Supp. 340 (W.D.N.Y. 1938) ; Leman v. Locke,
240 Mass. 551, 134 N.E. 343 (1922) ; Schellenberg v. Mullaney, 112 App. Div.
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adopting parents should have a weaker claim on the bankrupt estate
of the former father than the educational institutions or homes in
some of the other cases.
50
Does it or should it make any difference in the application of
the bankruptcy law if the claiming third party is the state? Two
recent cases have considered the problem, each reaching different
results for different reasons. The first is the New York case of
Hilliard v. DeCuiceisY- A New York statute provides that when-
ever welfare payments are made to support persons for whom the
defendant is liable, and the welfare officials thereafter find the de-
fendant possessed of assets, the welfare official may recover against
the defendant the amounts which were spent in support of his de-
pendents. In the DeCuiceis case the department had supplied sup-
port for defendant's dependents. Later, finding defendant possessed
of assets, the Commissioner brought suit and recovered a judg-
ment against him for the amount of benefits which had been sup-
plied. The defendant then filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy
and listed the welfare department as his sole creditor. Defendant
was discharged in due course. In a subsequent attempt to enforce the
judgment in favor of the welfare department, the New York court
held that the payments by the welfare department did not lessen the
defendant's obligation to support his dependents, and for that reason
the judgment was not one for support within the exception found in
section 17(2) of the Bankruptcy Act. But under similar circum-
stances a private party who supplies support not under contract with
the husband and father would have a nondischargeable claim.12 Is
there any reason apparent why the state should not have rights equal
to those of a private individual? The court's theory that the obliga-
tion of the bankrupt continued even though the state paid support
does not seem to distinguish this situation from the cases when a
private individual supplies room and board to a dependent when the
husband or father has refused or neglected to do so.
The second case involving the state as the claiming third party
384, 98 N.Y. Supp. 432 (2d Dept. 1906); Schwoll v. Meeks, 76 Ohio App.
231, 63 N.E.2d 831 (1944); Wintrode v. Connors, 67 Ohio App. 106, 35
N.E.2d 1018 (1941).
50 See note 39 supra.
1202 Misc. 197, 115 N.Y.S.2d 5 (Sup. Ct. 1952), criticized in Note, 53
COLUM. L. REv. 570 (1953).
" In re Myers, 12 F.2d 938 (W.D.N.Y. 1926); cf. cases cited note 49
supra.
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was State v. Murzyn.5 3 The state of Connecticut had supplied room
and board and medical care to the defendant's child in a state humane
institution. Under the law of Connecticut the parents became liable
for reimbursement to the state for this institutional support. While
the child was still in the hospital the state obtained an order requiring
the parents to pay $40 per week for the support of the child, and $30
per month to be applied to past expenditures for support and care.
When the child was released from the hospital the state asked that
the amounts then payable be continued and that the total amount be
applied to the arrears. The parents then filed voluntary petitions in
bankruptcy. Thereafter the state moved to hold defendant-father
in contempt of court for failure to pay in accordance with the order
above mentioned. In the meantime the father had been-discharged
in bankruptcy. The statute providing for reimbursement to the
state also provides that the court which enters the order may at any
time modify the order. The -court concluded that this claim of the
state was not a fixed liability. This was so because the state, under
the statute involved, -could ask that the amount of the obligation be
changed-at any time. Because this was not a fixed claim the-court
concluded that it was not a provable claim within section 63-of. the
Bankruptcy Act; and because it was not a provable claim it was not
a dischargeable claim. -This was held to be true of past amounts
unpaid and future amounts to accrue. The court further found that
the bankruptcy proceedings did not have the effect of purging the
defendants of their contempt. Because of the result reached by the
court, it is not known whether, if the court had found this a fixed
liability, they would have found it a result of contract with the
parents and dischargeable, or the result of state action without regard
to parental consent and thus perhaps nondischargeable. This case,
unlike the DeCuiceis case discussed above, gives the state an advan-
tage that an individual would not have. It would seem that the same
result should be reached in both cases as far as the Bankruptcy Act
is concerned. In both the Murayn and DeCuiceis cases the state
supplied support when the bankrupt either could not or would not
do so. The real difference in these two cases appears to be iii the
statutory remedy provided for collection of the state's right of re-
imbursement. In New York a simple judgment was available while
in Connecticut a conditional judgment or order was provided. ,-Is
it proper that the substantive rfghts of a bankrupt should turn on the
142 Conn. 329, 114 A.2d 210 (1955).
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niceties of state remedial procedure in collecting reimbursement for
welfare activities?
In an early case, In re Baker,"' it was determined that the obliga-
tion to support a bastard child was not a debt within the meaning
of the Bankruptcy Act and thus not dischargeable. Such an obliga-
tion was not to be distinguished from an obligation to support a
legitimate child. Although no recent cases were found on this
point, it seems apparent that such an obligation would fall within the
exception of section 17(2) as amended in 1903. The purpose of the
support order is the same whether the child is born in or out of
wedlock. In a much more recent New York case'J a man and woman
had celebrated a marriage and lived together as man and wife for
fifteen years. The parties agreed to a separation under which the
man would pay his "wife" monthly support. Thereafter it was dis-
covered that the "wife" had a living husband at the time of her
marriage to the man she had just separated from. The man asked
for and received an annulment. Sometimes later the man received
a discharge in bankruptcy. The "wife" sued for back payments
under the separation agreement and obtained a judgment. The
man resisted collection of the judgment by reason of his dis-
charge in bankruptcy. The court held that the bankruptcy pro-
ceeding discharged the debt to the "wife" because the wife's
judgment could not be within the exception of section 17(2)
since she was not in fact a wife. One might remark that it seems
difficult to see the difference between a child born without the bene-
fit of clergy and an "illegitimate" spouse. Clearly, that policy which
protects a woman from a discharge of her claim for alimony or sup-
port should also protect this woman. She lived for fifteen years as
a wife and suffered the same economic and social disadvantages as
the legitimate wife who has been married for the same period of
time. In Fife v. Fife,56 a case also involving an annulment, the court
held that an order entered in an annulment proceeding requiring the
former "husband" to pay off the mortgage on the parties' residence
was a judgment for a debt and was thus discharged in bankruptcy.
The case was expressly confined to its facts and the order requiring
the "husband" to pay off the mortgage might well have been called
a property settlement if the case had been the usual divorce situation.
96 Fed. 954 (D. Kan. 1899).
In re Collins, 53 N.Y.S.2d 316 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
r' 1 Utah 2d 281, 265 P.2d 642 (1954).
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Although it is readily to be admitted that there are great and impor-
tant legal distinctions between annulment and divorce, how important
are these when we are determining whether or not a man should be
able to escape liabilities for support of a woman who has become
dependent upon him through living together for a period of time?
The application of the bankruptcy laws should not turn on the nice-
ties of the laws of marriage and divorce. It might be observed that
in some countries, including England, it is perfectly proper to order
alimony in cases of annulment as well as divorce.
57
Suppose a situation, admittedly within the exception provided in
section 17(2), in which the wife has been awarded alimony.- May
the wife assign this right to a third party so as to preserve in the
third party the nondischargeable nature of the claim? Will it make
a difference whether the assignment is of accrued amounts 'or of
amounts to become due in the future? The Minnesota Supreme
Court answered a part of this problem in Cederberg v. Gunstron.58
The case involved a settlement agreement providing for alimony to
be paid for a period of three years at a stated. amount. The money
had all been paid except for $240 which was overdue. At that time
the wife assigned her claim for the overdue alimony payment to the
plaintiff, and the plaintiff promptly secured a judgment against the
husband for this amount. The husband later pleaded a discharge in
bankruptcy as a bar to the enforcement of the plaintiff's judgment.
On the issue of whether a claim for alimony is assignable, the Minne-
sota court said that it was as to amounts which had accrued, and
they found it unnecessary to comment on unaccrued alimony pay-
ments because of the facts of the case. On the dischargeability issue,
the court held that the judgment was one for alimony and was clearly
unaffected by the husband's subsequent discharge in bankruptcy. A
similar result with respect to assignability of accrued alimony was
reached in a recent Iowa case. In Siver v. Shebetka59 the court
held that accrued alimony, even though not a debt, would pass by
operation of law to the administratrix, and an action by the adminis-
tratrix for accrued alimony could be maintained. Again in this
case the court did not pass upon the question of future liability be-
cause, of course, the obligation ended with the demise of the wife.
The attitude of the courts seems to be that unaccrued alimony is not
" See ROYAL COMMIssION ON MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE REP. pt. VII
(1951-55).
8" 193 Minn. 421, 258 N.W. 574 (1935).
" 245 Iowa 965, 65 N,W.2d 173 (1954).
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assignable as a matter of public policy.60 It would seem that insofar
as accrued alimony payments are assignable, they should retain their
nondischargeable nature in the hands of the assignee, not to protect
the assignee but rather to preserve a market for the wife who is
under pressure economically. One further qualification should be
added. In cases where an assignee is seeking to enforce an assign-
ment of accrued alimony after bankruptcy and discharge of the hus-
band, the court should examine the actual consideration paid to the
wife and enforce the post-bankruptcy claim only to that extent.
In Hylek v. Hylek 1 a case somewhat akin to the above discus-
sion, a wife obtained a divorce decree which ordered the husband to
make'support payments for the benefit of their minor children. Later,
the wife obtained a judgment for the accrued arrears of support
payments and attempted to enforce the judgment against the husband.
The husband defended on the grounds that he had since obtained a
discharge in bankruptcy. He argued that the judgment for accrued
support was a provable debt and hence discharged by bankruptcy.
The bankrupt-husband further argued that the judgment should not
be enforced because the children for whose benefit the support order
was entered were now of age. The court, in holding that the judg-
ment was not discharged, pointed out that it had the duty to look
behind the judgment to ascertain the nature of the claim upon which
the judgment had been based. It was felt that the judgment for the
support was not a' mere debt; rather the judgment was merely the
means used to enforce the obligation to support. The court. further
stated that the fact that the children for whose benefit the support
order was entered were now of age and emancipated made no dif-
ference upon the dischargeability of the claim which the wife had
reduced to judgment. On the point made in this case to the effect
that the court can.go behind a judgment to ascertain the nature of
the claim upon which the judgment was based, this is true of all the
exceptions found insection 17.62
CONCLUSION
To the reader who has come this far it will be apparent that the
domestic liabilities exception found in section 17(2) of the Bank-
" See NELSON, DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT § 14.08 (2d ed. 1961); Annot.,
97 A.L.R. 208 (1935).
53 F. Supp. 657 (N.D. Ind. 1944).
02 Gilchrist v. Cotton, 83 Ind. App. 415, 148 N.E. 435 (1925); Maier v.
Maier, 77 Misc. 145, 135 N.Y. Supp. 1038 (Sup. Ct. 1912).
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ruptcy Act has, in a broad sense, served its office well. There -are only
a few problem areas which deserve reconsideration. The most im-
portant of the unsettled questions is the provability of the wife's claim
for alimony or support of herself or child in the bankrupt's estate.
Because of the history of the 1903 amendment to section "17 it has
been thought by many judges and writers that the amendment did
not .change the nonprovability decisions of the United States Supreme
Court. The highest court has never passed upon the issue of 'the
provability of the wife's claim for alimony or support in the bank-
ruptcy proceedings under the present section, and it is apparent that
unless Congress intended to harm the standing of the wife in 1903
such claim should be provable. The distinction between accrued and
future claims for alimony has not given the courts much trouble;
the accrued claim is a fixed liability and the claim for future alimony
or support is a contingent claim incapable of measurement with suffi-
cient certainty to meet the requirements of the Bankruptcy Act. It
might be advisable for Congress to consider treating the wife in
somewhat the same manner as the landlord is treated in ordinary
bankruptcy. 3 Thus it would be possible to allow the wife to claim
for future alimony or support, but arbitrarily limit the extent of any
allowable claim to an amount equal to one year's support or alimony.
The courts have also been troubled with allocating agreements
or decrees into the nondischargeable alimony or support category,
or the dischargeable property settlement. The rule here is clear but
the trouble lies in the criteria for application. When we seek the
reasons for allocation to one category or the other, many of the
opinions leave much to be desired. In making its determination of
the dischargeability of a settlement agreement or decree, the court
should be free to look to all the circumstances in which the parties
were at the time of the making of the agreement or order. It seems
somewhat hasty, and perhaps overlooks the essential purpose of the
Bankruptcy Act for a court, passing on the issue of discharge, to find
that because alimony is not allowed in favor of the guilty party to a
divorce proceeding, this particular agreement or order cannot be
alimony or support within the meaning of section 17(2).
The claims of third parties which fall within the exception dis-
cussed in this article are for the most part given uniform treatment.
" Cf. Bankruptcy Act § 63(a) (9), 52 Stat. 873 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 103
(a) (9) (1958).
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If the third party contracted to give services or goods which are
necessary to the support of a wife or child, that party does not obtain
a claim which will survive bankruptcy. However, in those few in-
stances when the third party supplies necessary goods or services
without the consent of the bankrupt, under circumstances in which
the law would create a duty of reimbursement, then such third party
has a claim which is unaffected by bankruptcy. It should make no
difference whether that third party is the state or a private citizen.
